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Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to an empirical and theoretical understanding of democracy and political 
participation in India through an ethnographic study of the meanings attached to voting in rural 
Tamil Nadu.  Based on a study of voting in a rural constituency during the 2009 national 
elections, the paper explores the variety of motivations that compel people to vote.  It explores 
how voting is informed by popular understandings of rights and duties as citizens, programmatic 
policies and their local implementation, commitment to caste and party loyalties, and authority of 
charismatic leaders.  The paper explores the roots of the political consciousness and rights 
awareness that underpin high levels of electoral participation.  It suggests that elections form 
unique moments that allow ordinary people to experience an individual sense of citizenship and 
of democracy itself while at the same time allowing them to pursue projects of recognition, 
respect and assertion as members of communities.  It is precisely this dual feature that makes 
voting so enduringly attractive to India’s contemporary electorate. 
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1. Introduction1  
                                                 
1 This research was carried out while undertaking 12 months of fieldwork in Tamil Nadu in 2008-9 and was funded 
by an ESRC-DFID Research Award (RES 167 25 0296). The researchers also participated in Mukulika 
Banerjee’s ESRC-funded ‘Comparative Electoral Ethnographies’ project (RES 000-22-3376). The research 
would not have been possible without the support of our research assistants – most especially Gayathri, Adele 
Fash, Arul and Muthu. The paper has benefitted from comments by Chris Fuller, John Harriss, the editor and 
four anonymous reviewers. 
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This article seeks to contribute to an empirical and theoretical understanding of democracy and 
political participation through an ethnography of the meanings attached to voting in rural Tamil 
Nadu, South India.  Despite the substantial insights they offer, election studies have been 
critiqued for what Lama-Rewal calls their focus ‘on the “mechanics” more than on the 
“substance” of representative democracy’ (2009: 2). Studies of elections and voting tend to 
explore the processes, trends and patterns of the electoral process rather than taking voting as 
an entry into understanding democracy and citizenship itself (Diwakar 2008; Kumar 2009; 
Chandra 2009).  Ethnographic approaches, by contrast, are well suited to the study of the 
meanings people attach to voting as a key aspect of democracy as well as to an exploration of 
voting as a window onto culturally specific understandings of rights, duties and citizenship 
(Lama-Rewal 2009: 4; Banerjee 2007: 1556).  Yet, remarkably little ethnographic research has 
focused on elections or on the ideas and meanings the electorate attach to voting.  Struck by 
India’s persistently high levels of voter turnout, Banerjee raised the question: ‘why do people 
whose lives in fact improve very little from election to election, nonetheless continue to think of 
them as important events which “demand “ their participation?’ (2007: 1556).  In what follows, 
we seek to contribute to this research through an analysis of why people vote in India, based on 
an ethnographic study of a rural constituency in Tamil Nadu at the time of the 2009 national 
elections.2   
 
There are many reasons why India is an ideal place to explore the above questions.  Not only 
does it form the world’s largest democracy, but democracy and citizenship are almost 
continually discussed and debated in the media, in scholarship and in everyday life.  Moreover, 
in contrast to many other established democracies (Blais et al 2004; Franklin 2004; Gray and 
Caul 2000) electoral participation in India has been consistently high, and turnout at national 
elections has not fallen below 58% since 1984 (Jaffrelot 2008: 37; Kumar 2009). If anything, 
turnout rates have increased since 1951, with the 1990s being particularly marked by rising 
levels of participation – the so-called ‘second democratic upsurge’ - which reflected an 
increased interest in elections among disadvantaged sections of society (Yadav 1996; 2000). By 
2009, participation in elections had stabilised, with a turnout rate of 58.8%, in line with rates 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2 The 2009 election constituted a national-level election in which a new central government was elected.  The 2006 
and 2011 elections were state-level elections in which a state government was elected.  While it is said that people 
tend to be more enthusiastic about state elections than national elections, participation rates have steadily increased 
for both elections in Tamil Nadu since 2004. 
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from any of the elections over the previous 20 years (Kumar 2009: 48; Palshikar and Kumar 
2004: 5412). In the state of Tamil Nadu, however, where this study is located, rates are even 
higher, with a mean voter turnout of 64.4% for 1951-2004 (Diwakar 2008: 83). Furthermore, as 
Figure 1 shows Tamil Nadu has seen significant increases in electoral participation, which in 
recent years have exceeded all-India levels (Kumar 2009: 48, Special Statistics 2011: 138, 
Figure 1). It is therefore a perfect place to ask why people are so committed to voting and to 
explore their understanding of political participation, citizenship and democracy.   
 
Figure 1 – Voter turnout for national and state elections, 1989-2011 
 
(Source: Compiled from Palshikar and Kumar 2004, Kumar 2009, Special Statistics 2011) 
 
One further voting trend identified across India is also worth mentioning.  In India marginalised 
groups have higher participation rates than more privileged groups, with Palshikar and Kumar 
noting higher participation amongst poor, lower caste and poorly educated people (2004: 5142, 
Yadav 1996), the inverse of what has been observed in several other democracies (Franklin 
2004).  In Tamil Nadu too the turnout of 78% among Dalits in 2009 exceeded the average of 
73% (Kumar 2009: 48), albeit not excessively. This seems to corroborate Jaffrelot’s conclusion 
that in India ‘the poorer one is, the more one votes, and the richer one is, the less one votes’ 
(2008: 38; see also Krishna 2008).3 
 
                                                 
3 Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), however, warns us that the evidence on the poor turning out in larger numbers is 
in fact highly incomplete and inconclusive.  What can be concluded, according to Kitschelt and Wilkinson, is that 
the poor in India vote at proportions not too far off those of the better off. 
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Field-based research on voting has offered various explanations for Indians’ commitment to 
electoral participation.  Some have described the figure of the rational or instrumental voter who 
participates in the hope of obtaining material benefit or livelihood improvement.  Chandra, for 
example, argues that poorer people in India use their vote as their ‘primary channel of influence’ 
(2004: 3), and thus interprets the high turnout as for instrumental reasons:  
The best form of political participation is to obtain political office, which provides the most 
secure guarantee of access to [survival] goods. … A second-best form of political 
participation is voting. Voters do not themselves have control over the distribution of 
goods. But by voting strategically and voting often, they can increase their chances of 
obtaining these goods (ibid: 4).  
 
This is echoed in Witsoe’s study of democracy in Bihar where for many lower-caste villagers 
voting was about getting access to resources.  Witsoe mentions the ‘feeling of entitlement that a 
voter has to make concrete demands of the politicians that he or she helped to elect …’ (2011: 
626).  Similarly, Ruud’s research on popular understandings of democracy in rural Bangladesh 
revealed that villagers were keen to elect efficient and experienced leaders who protect the 
poor, deliver services and ‘supply “development” in its many facets’ (2011: 57).  The vote was 
considered crucial as a tool to do away with representatives ‘that do not “supply”’ (ibid: 67). 
 
Others have emphasised the ritualised and celebratory dimensions of voting that turn elections 
in India into major ceremonial events.  Banerjee’s description of the excitement and celebratory 
nature of election events in two West Bengali villages indicates ‘that elections are clearly 
regarded and treated as being in substantially the same space as religious festivals and rites of 
passage celebrations’ (2007: 1558). Elections, Banerjee argues, have a ‘sacred’ or ‘sacrosanct’ 
dimension to them which imbue them with an importance far beyond the mere act of voting 
itself: they ‘offer an opportunity for the expression of citizenship, and for an understanding of the 
duties an rights involved in living in a democracy (ibid.: 1561).  
 
Others again recognise that not everyone votes for the same reason or attaches the same 
values and meanings to electoral participation. In a recent multi-state study, Ahuja and Chhibber 
(2012) explore variations in motivations for voting in India between the poor and the non-poor. 
They argue that while the poor see voting as a right, the non-poor vote either to gain some 
benefit or because they see it as a duty. They relate these different explanations to these 
groups’ different relationship with the state. The poor and marginalised, who ‘face a capricious 
state that mostly ignores or mistreats them except on Election Day’ (ibid.: 391), see elections as 
the one time that the state recognises them and treats them as ‘equals’.  They vote because 
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they consider it their right.  The non-poor by contrast are networked within the state and look for 
mobility through working with it (ibid.: 400). The non-poor therefore vote to access opportunities, 
but also because of a sense of civic duty: voting is something that all good citizens should do. 
Ahuja and Chhibber’s analysis (2012) differs from previous work in that it moves away from a 
singular explanation and presents different motivations for different social groups. 
 
This article similarly explores why voting is so enthusiastically embraced in India.  Our 
ethnographic study from a village in western Tamil Nadu illustrates a variety of motivations that 
compel people to take part in elections and indicates that any single factor falls short of 
explaining high turnout rates.  Importantly, however, in a final section we also consider those 
who do not vote and provide an explanation for non-voting both in terms of people’s electoral 
commitment and the bureaucratic processes that affect voting behaviour.  As such, we argue for 
a holistic sociological approach to voting that explores the range of individual and social 
motivations that enthuse people to participate in elections, and we propose two broad 
conclusions.  First, the much debated rational choice model of voter participation (Downs 1957) 
is simply inadequate to grasp the diversity of motivations that lead people to vote in India.  
Secondly, we suggest that elections form unique moments that allow ordinary people to 
experience an individual sense of citizenship and of democracy itself while at the same time 
allowing them to seek recognition, respect and assertion.  It is precisely this dual feature of 
voting, as an act that gives recognition to both poor and rich as individual citizens and as 
members of communities, that makes electoral participation so attractive to India’s electorate. 
 
2. The study village: changing state-level politics and patronage relations 
 
Before turning to our study village, some features of the recent history of politics in Tamil Nadu 
need mentioning.  We briefly introduce four key elements of Tamil politics that not only shape 
the current political formation in the state but that also help make sense of our village 
observations.  First, Tamil politics have been dominated by two regional parties, aka Dravidian 
parties: the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam), which first came to power in 1967, and the 
AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, aka ADMK), which was launched 
following a split from the DMK in 1972.  These rival Dravidian parties have alternately ruled the 
state since 1967, and their continued domination of politics is evident at the village level.  
Despite Dravidian parties’ initial strong egalitarian and secular ideology, Dalits were gradually 
marginalised within these parties which came to be dominated by intermediate castes (Harriss 
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2002, Gorringe 2007, Wyatt 2010).  Second, since at least the 1980s the Dravidian hegemony 
has been challenged by a rapid fragmentation of the political party landscape.  Smaller parties 
emerged, many of them being the product of caste-based political mobilisations including by 
Dalits (Karthikeyan et al 2012: 31, Gorringe 2007). Examples include the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
Katchi (VCK or Dalit Panthers) started by the Dalit Paraiyars, the Puthiya Tamilagam (PT) of the 
Dalit Pallars, and the influential Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), formed by the lower-caste 
Vanniyars.  Moreover, this political fragmentation has not only intensified competition for votes 
in Tamil Nadu but also encouraged people to vote (De Neve and Carswell 2011, Karthikeyan et 
al 2012, Wyatt 2010).  Importantly, Gorringe comments, Dalit mobilisation and political 
organisation ‘have raised consciousness, challenged residual forms of untouchability and forced 
Dalit issues into the political limelight. Whilst Dalit organisations are still peripheral to the 
corridors of power, they have gained political recognition and placed their concerns onto the 
agenda’ (2010: 119). Indeed, as we will discuss below, they have played a key role in raising 
electoral awareness and pulling villagers to the polling booth.   
 
Third, there has long existed ‘a symbiotic relationship between the medium of cinema and that 
of politics’ in Tamil Nadu (Pandian 1992: 33, Wyatt 2013a).  Both DMK and ADMK have 
nurtured close alliances with the popular world of cinema as a means to gain political influence 
and woe voters.  Many leading politicians of the last half-century first rose to fame through the 
cinema, either as film actors (e.g. MG Ramachandran, popularly known as MGR, founder of the 
ADMK, and J. Jayalalitha, current ADMK leader and chief minister) or as screenwriters (e.g. M. 
Karunanidhi, the party’s current leader)4.  Most emblematic of the way in which stardom has 
been mobilised for political purposes is the ‘MGR phenomenon’, which continues to attract 
voters and influence voting patterns in Tamil Nadu today.   Pandian described how the DMK 
from the 1950s, and later the ADMK, ‘skilfully transferred MGR’s cinematic image to the domain 
of politics’ (1992: 11), turning MGR into the state’s most popular politician ever and three-times 
elected chief minister.  MGR, and others after him, successfully projected their on-screen image 
as protector of the poor and downtrodden onto their real selves so as to attain electoral success 
(ibid.: 39-43, Rogers 2009).  The strategy paid off.  Even today it shapes the public image of 
actors-turned-politicians and fuels the consciousness of many poor and low-caste people whose 
eagerness to vote is informed by images and memories of legendary film actors like MGR. Even 
though Tamil Nadu is certainly not unique, politics and cinema are nevertheless closely tied up 
                                                 
4 There are many others such as screenwriter C.N. Annadurai, founder of the DMK, and filmstar Vijaykanth who 
started the DMDK in 2005. 
7 
in this southern state and the cinematic image of many politicians continues to appeal to the 
electorate (Dickey 1993). 
 
Finally, although Dravidian politics has long been steeped in patronage politics and in a populist 
rhetoric that sought to reach out to the ‘common people’ (Subramanian 1999, Harriss 2000, 
Wyatt 2013b), more recently a significant shift has taken place away from clientelist politics 
towards an increased use of programmatic policies to attract votes (Wyatt 2013a).  While 
clientelism - in which appeals to voters are based on selective hand-outs of benefits and 
patronage - has certainly not disappeared, its relatively ‘poor record has encouraged political 
leaders to explore post-clientelist approaches to governing’ (Wyatt 2013a: 30).  These include a 
trend towards a programmatic approach, in which voters’ attention is drawn to a party’s policies 
and its implementation, and in which contingent benefits are replaced by more universal 
schemes that benefit everyone. Wyatt emphasises that this shift is not new in Tamil Nadu.  It 
had its roots in the early universal welfare schemes launched under ADMK rule in the 1980s, 
such as the 1982 MGR Nutritious Noon Meal Scheme that provided free meals to all school 
children (2013a: 33).  However, ahead of the 2006 state elections the DMK turned to a more 
explicitly programmatic manifesto targeting the poor: its promises included using the Public 
Distribution System (PDS) to provide 20 kg of rice at Rs 2 per kilo, free colour televisions and 
gas stoves for the poor (ibid.: 38).  Having won the 2006 state elections, it was the 
implementation of the DMK’s welfare programmes that the people of Tamil Nadu, including 
those in our study village, were scrutinising and debating in the run-up to the 2009 elections.  
The further introduction of ‘one rupee rice’ in 2008 was probably the most discussed policy in 
the village in 2009.  Politicians’ enhanced commitment to implementing policies with a universal 
reach - such as the PDS and more recently the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGA) - not only confirms the shift to a ‘programmatic style of 
governing’ (Wyatt 2013a: 43) but also encourages electoral participation.  
 
Turning to our study site, research was carried out in the run-up to the 2009 national elections. 
The fieldwork was conducted in a village, which we call Allapuram, in rural Tamil Nadu where 
we also conducted research on changing agrarian relations and the effects of the garment 
industry on rural livelihoods (Carswell 2013; Carswell and De Neve 2014a). As the election 
approached we spent our days with different resident groups of the village. Using a combination 
of participant observation, case-studies, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews we 
talked with villagers about the election and the campaign, about voting, its meaning and effects, 
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and about democracy and politics more generally. 
 
[INSERT MAP ABOUT HERE] 
 
Allapuram is located 19km south of the booming garment manufacturing and export town of 
Tiruppur, and is at the heart of the highly industrialised western region of Tamil Nadu (see Map 
1).5 The village is known for its successful and viable agriculture, but is also a village which 
sends significant numbers of commuters (across castes) to work in the Tiruppur industry. In 
Allapuram Gounders are the dominant caste in terms of economic wealth and political power, 
owning most of the land in the village (Carswell and De Neve 2014a). At the other end of the 
social spectrum are two Dalit groups: Matharis (aka Arunthathiyars) who are the lowest ranking 
of all the Dalit groups and Adi Dravidas (aka Paraiyars) many of whom have converted to 
Christianity.6 Between these two extremes there are a number of other castes, such as dhobi 
and barber, who are considered lower to middle-ranking within the village.  
 
In the past the livelihoods of land-owning Gounders and landless Dalits were closely connected, 
with the latter working for Gounders as agricultural labourers (often as bonded farm labourers or 
pannaiyaal, see Carswell and De Neve 2013). Wider market-led and state-led transformations, 
however, have changed these local social relations. Jobs in Tiruppur’s garment industry are 
available to people from across castes and offer attractive and rewarding opportunities for 
people to leave agricultural work (Carswell 2013). Getting jobs outside the village has not only 
given lower castes unprecedented economic opportunities, but also enhanced their confidence 
and self-esteem.  Gounders too shifted their attention to the garment industry, and the result 
has been that today – in this village at least – Gounders and Dalits are increasingly 
disinterested in each other, living largely independent economic lives. Caste has therefore 
begun to lose much of its previous socio-economic significance in Allapuram, and the 
importance of patronage has dwindled considerably (Carswell and De Neve 2014a).7  At the 
same time a range of government schemes has made an impact on social relations in the 
village. Social welfare policies introduced from the 1960s include universal schooling, PDS, 
                                                 
5 All names of people and places have been anonymised. 
6 Some have Christian on their community certificates, while others have Adi Dravida. Some people said that they 
referred to themselves in different ways depending on context. Whilst known as Christians in the village, they are 
treated largely as Dalits. 
7 It is worth noting that there is a huge diversity of transformations within this region. Elsewhere we have stressed 
the importance of being sensitive to the spatial variations in the ways in which caste relations are being transformed 
(Carswell and De Neve 2013; 2014a). 
9 
school midday meals, housing schemes and, more recently, MGNREGA (Heyer 2012; Carswell 
and De Neve 2014b; Still 2011).  These policies, which aim to alleviate poverty, have without 
doubt contributed to improvements in the material conditions of Dalits’ lives, and this has gone 
hand in hand with their increased ability to pursue livelihoods independent from local landlords.  
Our own village-level material as well as village studies by Heyer (2012) reveal the particular 
importance for the rural electorate of emerging programmatic policies, discussed by Wyatt 
(2013a) at the state level. 
 
Finally, some established voting patterns in the village need to be mentioned. Matharis have a 
long history of voting for ADMK and revere MGR for his role in supporting Dalits, giving them 
respect as a low-caste community, and improving their livelihoods, not in the least through his 
famous free school meals scheme. Adi Dravida Christians have tended to vote for DMK as they 
are wary of the ADMK’s historical association with the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP).  Gounders in the region do not have a single political allegiance and their vote tends to 
be split between the main Dravidian parties.  However, in 2009 the Gounders launched a new 
caste-based party, the Kongu Nadu Munnetra Kazhagam (KNMK, or Kongu Region 
Development Party), in an attempt to unite the Gounder vote against the established parties 
(see De Neve and Carswell 2011, De Neve and Carswell, in prep.) 
 
3. Why do people vote?  
 
We now turn to our key question ‘why do people vote’ and present some of the main issues that 
were brought up by villagers.  Frequently, answers to the question ‘why do you vote’ focus on 
why people vote for a particular party (even if that was not the question asked), but these 
answers do reveal much about why people vote per se, which is the focus of this article.  
 
Instrumental voting: material benefits and state schemes 
 
In line with what other studies have suggested, voting in our village is at least in part motivated 
by the material gains that people envisage deriving from it (Chandra 2004, Ruud 2011).  One 
widowed woman, who never missed a vote but who admits not always voting for the same 
party, said that she decides who to vote for by looking at who will ‘help people’. More 
particularly, she would look at who is likely to increase the old age pension, provide water 
facilities and ensure that the prices of commodities go down. She explained to us that she would 
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vote for whoever she felt most likely to provide such things, and emphasized that she always 
votes. 
 
Periyasamy, a Dalit Adi Dravida Christian, who commutes daily to Tiruppur where he works as a 
skilled ironing master in a garment company, is very pragmatic in his approach: ‘there is no 
change, but we still vote.  I have always voted … I look at the candidate and at what they are 
likely to do, and I’ll change from DMK to ADMK to other parties.  Last time, they gave us a 
government loan to build this extension [to our house].  That was under the ADMK, so I voted 
for them.  Now the DMK has given us roads and street lights.  Whoever is giving something at 
the time of election, that’s whom I will vote for.’ But, again, he made it very clear that he always 
votes. Material gains, usually expressed as benefits from particular state schemes, are an 
undisputable drive for less well-off and vulnerable villagers to vote, and villagers were well 
aware of the promises made by the DMK at the time of the 2006 state-level elections regarding 
the distribution of cheap rice, and free TVs and gas stoves (Wyatt 2013a). The lower-caste and 
poorer people of the village were clearly assessing the ruling DMK on the basis of electoral 
promises and ongoing policy delivery. However, it is not only the poor who are motivated to vote 
by the prospects of personal gain from state programmes. A wealthy Gounder landowner made 
similar considerations.  He was explicit about favouring Congress in national elections as they 
wavered many agricultural loans, while supporting DMK at the state level because they gave 
free electricity to farmers.  
 
Not only past but also anticipated benefits shape people’s voting behaviour.  Anthony and his 
uncle Ponnarasu, both Christian Adi Dravidas employed in Tiruppur, explained how their 
expectations inform their voting behaviour: ‘In places where there is a thottam [Gounder farm] 
they build a bus stop, but for us [Dalits] they are not providing one.  But I will still vote, because 
we expect that perhaps the next government will lay a good road or provide that bus stop.  
People are always expecting something, so they vote!’  Indeed, the expectation, or perhaps 
distant hope, that votes will yield concrete resources drives people to vote.  Villagers proved 
themselves to be astute observers of government policies and made careful judgements on 
which promised welfare schemes were most likely to be implemented and how they would 
benefit from them. But different social groups make different assessments. For example, while 
some approve of ‘one rupee rice’, others – especially Gounder landlords – criticise it for making 
workers lazy and reducing the supply of labour.  Assessments of policies thus vary and depend 
on one’s class position (Ahuja and Chibber 2012), but it is the delivery of specific party 
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programmes – and especially universal welfare schemes – that is central to how people across 
classes judge government performance and gauge future impacts of party manifestoes.  
 
Mr Kulandaisamy, a former panchayat president and member of the Mathari community in the 
village, clarifies that for some the desire to vote is less a matter of rational choice than the only 
tool of political participation available to them. He was particularly referring to his own Mathari 
community, the state’s lowest ranking Dalit caste.  ‘There is no other way for us.  Paraiyars  
have Thirumavalavan [as their leader] and the Pallars have John Pandian to look after them and 
even to use violence on their behalf, but we Matharis have nobody to stand up for us and we 
have no money to organise. We are not even able to use violence to attract people’s attention.  
So, we have to vote.  If you put your vote, change will come’.  Kulandaisamy makes a crucial 
point here.  Voting is not just a way of gaining material benefits, but for some like the Matharis it 
is the only way to be heard by the state in the absence of any other form of mobilisation or 
political organisation.  Lacking the resources to organise themselves as a civil society 
movement or political party, the only option left is to vote.  This supports Chandra’s argument 
that where one is unable to directly obtain political office, the ‘second-best form of political 
participation is voting’ (2004: 4).   
 
An important distinction needs to be made between higher level party policies and local policy 
delivery.  Villagers are patently aware of high level policies – such as PDS and MGNREGA – 
and most can clearly identify policies and programmes with specific parties.  What parties 
promise and implement is closely observed in the run-up to elections.  Villagers have a 
remarkable awareness of parties’ welfare schemes, and it is clear that their programmatic 
policies encourage villagers to vote and to vote for particular parties (Wyatt 2013a, Koteswara 
Prasad 2009).  What voters are most directly affected by, however, is the way policies are 
implemented locally, and indeed the way they are transformed by local political actors and 
relationships (Jeffrey 2000; Ruud 2011; Witsoe 2011).  Following a visit to the village by a 
DMDK candidate on the campaign trail, an older Christian Adi Dravida woman told us what she 
perceived to be the failure of politicians: ‘Karunanidhi [DMK leader] promised us a television, 
and hasn’t given it. … The whole area around here hasn’t got a TV, no drinking water, no bus 
stop. All the neighbouring villages have …it is because of local politics … conflicts between 
people of two different parties within the village’.  Local politics and how they affect delivery by 
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the local state hugely influence why people vote and indeed how they vote8 (see also Ruud 
2011 for similar observations in rural Bangladesh).  
 
Local politics and the behaviour of local party representatives may also produce radical shifts in 
people’s voting behaviour, but not their decision to vote per se. This is well illustrated by the 
case of Gayathri, a woman who had always voted ADMK. Following a dispute with the local 
ADMK politician over obtaining a signature for a water connection, she turned to the DMK, 
promising she would never again support the ADMK. Crucially to our argument, however, the 
dispute never made her reconsider whether to vote at all, something she was fully committed to. 
What Gayathri is exemplary of is the increasingly independent voter who is not tied by clientelist 
bonds to vote (or to vote in a particular way) but is able to assess party programmes and local 
government representatives, and change her vote accordingly.  While acts of patronage may 
continue to compel party activists to vote, as Markussen has recently shown (2011), a sharp 
decline in economic patron-client relationships in the village goes hand in hand with increasing 
political independence, in which the electorate make up their own minds on who to vote for.  
While we repeatedly asked about vote buying, everyone in the village confirmed that no money 
changes hands in this region and that it would not make any difference anyway.  
 
Urimai and Kadamai: between right and duty 
 
Less tangible considerations too shape the intense interest in voting among our informants.  
These considerations evolve around strongly-held notions of voting as a ‘right’ and a ‘duty’, 
adhered to by villagers across the class spectrum.  Moreover, notions of rights and duties 
appear as closely interconnected concepts in commentaries on elections, and their popular 
usage reveals a great deal about villagers’ understandings of citizenship and democracy. In this 
section we explore popular understandings of civic rights and duties, and contextualise them 
within the political history of Tamil Nadu. 
 
When asked ‘why do you vote?’ or ‘why do people vote?’, people often reply that they vote 
‘because it is our right (urimai)’ or ‘because it is our duty (kadamai)’ as citizens of India.  Voting 
is often simultaneously perceived as a right, given by the state to its citizens, and as a duty, a 
task people feel they have to fulfil as citizens.  The meaning of these terms is to be derived from 
                                                 
8 There is a significant gender dimension to this too, but this is beyond the scope of this article.  
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the context in which they are used, as some examples illustrate. Take the case of Anthony and 
his mother, Sangeetha. Anthony is a 25-year old Christian Adi Dravidar who works as a cutting 
master in the Tiruppur garment industry where he earns a good salary.  His brother works as a 
skilled tailor in the same industry.  Both are unmarried and live with their widowed mother who 
works as a casual agricultural labourer.  Their house was recently renovated and extended.  
While Sangeetha talks about the hardships they faced in the past, they readily assert that their 
lives have substantially improved thanks to ‘Tiruppur jobs’.  Turning to the topic of elections, we 
ask whether she will vote.    
Sangeetha answers: I can’t be without voting; we both have not missed any vote … we 
always think: whoever might come next, will they do something good for us? Parties are 
changing all the time, but there is no change for us … 
 
Anthony adds: I will look at the policy of a party. Here ADMK is very strong, and only the 
last time the DMK won here. … 
 
Sangeetha: We will ask: what will they do for the people? Many people got free loans, 
but we had to … get a commercial loan, which we are still repaying today. I didn’t get a 
free loan, so I am fed up with all the parties.  
 
GDN: So why do you vote then?   
 
Sangeetha: There is no meaning to life in this world if I do not vote, it is meaningless not 
to vote! 
 
GDN: What do you mean with this? 
 
Anthony explains: If we don’t vote, we are giving up our right, it is our right (urimai)! 
 
In talking about voting Sangeetha and Anthony move back and forth between two levels. At one 
level, they dwell on pragmatic gains from government schemes, while at another level, they 
refer to something much more fundamental, something ‘they cannot be without’.  This 
fundamental issue is ultimately expressed as a right, but not just any right.  It is a much valued 
right that should not be given up under any circumstance and, more importantly, a right that 
gives ‘meaning to life in this world’.   
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Karpagam, a first time voter studying at a local teacher training college, asks me in reply to the 
voting question: ‘It’s our right (urimai), so why should we give it up?  The only right of Tamil 
people is the vote, so why should we give it up?’ On another occasion she said: I’m very happy 
[to be voting]. This is the first time I’ve been given this responsibility (kadamai). This is my right 
and no-one can interfere with that.’ Several informants identified the right to vote as ‘the only 
right of Tamil people’, which reflects a sense of an ‘ absolute’ or ‘guaranteed’ right that - unlike 
social and economic rights which are much more ill-defined and elusive - cannot be taken away 
from them.  Karpagam’s statement also reveals how this right is simultaneously conceived of as 
a duty or responsibility, that is, as a right that they feel strongly obliged to use.  Implied in 
informants’ reflections is a distinct sense of moral duty or responsibility rather than any sort of 
contractual obligation.  While certainly not everyone is passionate about politics, almost 
everyone is passionate about voting itself, considering it morally wrong ‘to waste a vote’ or ‘to 
give up this right’ (Banerjee 2007: 1560).  Other informants expressed this in comparable ways.  
Rajan, a tailor in Allapuram, told us ‘I have never wasted [in English] a vote, that is the only right 
(urimai) we have …. No one can interfere with that.’  One Mathari woman said she always votes 
despite the many failed promises.  When questioned why she votes if it made no difference, she 
replied: ‘the thing is written on our forehead’, implying that it is simply something they have to 
do.    
 
A young Christian Adi Dravida, from a staunchly DMK family, said this about voting: ‘It is our 
only right in our country.  We are nothing if we are not voting, we are not worth anything if we do 
not vote.’  His father added: ‘Only dead people will not vote. If you don’t vote, it means you are 
not living.’  A non-Dalit woman in the main village similarly stated: ‘It is our right to vote; if you 
are not voting then you are not living. Only those who have died will be removed from the list.  
There is no meaning to living if you are not voting.’ Gurusamy, a Gounder farmer with no 
particular party loyalties or interest in politics, and who claims to decide only in the last minute 
who to vote for, had this to say: ‘There is no respect for us if we don’t vote. There is no meaning 
in life if you don’t put a vote. If I don’t vote, it’s like I am dead. It isn’t that we vote for a good 
person or a bad person, but it is our duty to put a vote. They earn millions of rupees and we 
don’t benefit but still we vote.’  Clearly, the very act of voting is prioritised over voting for the 
‘right’ candidate.   
 
On election day a group of five women from the Christian area discussed why they always vote.  
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One said: ‘It is a sign that I belong to this nation; if I don’t vote then I don’t have an identity. … It 
is our right (urimai), it is our duty (kadamai).’ We asked: ‘What do you mean by duty?’ And she 
replied: ‘It is our duty to elect our leaders.  I feel empowered to choose them.’  The right to vote 
is indeed seen by many as one of the ways in which the state recognises the very existence of 
people, or as one Mathari woman puts it: ‘it [voting] is the only evidence that I am here’.  
Passionate statements like those above reflect two important points.  Firstly, they reveal the 
immense weight ordinary villagers attach to voting. Voting is not only seen as a valued right but 
is it recognised as the very act that turns people into citizens.  It is the act through which they 
gain formal recognition by the state as members of the nation.  By stating that if they do not vote 
they do not have an identity, villagers reflect on their civic identity as citizens of the Indian 
nation.  Or, as Ahuja and Chhibber put it, ‘the act of voting recognizes the poor as citizens in the 
eyes of the state and those who run it’ (2012: 4).  This transpires most emphatically from 
emotive outbursts that if one does not vote, one does not exist - in a political sense at least - as 
a citizen of India. For Periyasamy, a Christian Adi Dravida employed in Tiruppur, voting and 
being an Indian citizen is indeed one and the same thing: ‘As an Indian citizen (kudimagan) I 
have to vote; I have to select a representative for parliament.’  Secondly, such statements also 
illustrate an awareness that voting can make a difference.  By voting one can elect particular 
leaders and parties while rejecting others.  At no other time can this be done.  This is borne out 
by the fact that due to the ‘first past the post’ rule, a minor swing in votes can often produce 
substantial shifts in results, and indeed oust politicians and parties. This clearly points to a 
popular understanding of voting as a unique means of political action, and as an act that is 
particularly significant in the absence of other forms of political participation.   
 
Mr Murthy, a Gounder and District Treasurer for the DMDK, answered the question ‘why do 
people vote?’ as follows: ‘Adu taan jananayakam! (That is what democracy is!) Adu taan 
makkalatchi! (That is what people’s rule is!)  Adu kadamai illaea? (That is our duty, isn’t it?)’.  
Here, Murthy uses the words duty or responsibility (kadamai) and people’s rule (makkalatchi), 
which move us onto the terrain of democracy: voting is seen as the materialisation of 
democracy (for which usually the vernacular jananayakam is used) itself.  It is presented as the 
very act through which democracy, conceived of as people’s rule, is realised in a direct and 
tangible manner.  Hence, voting is considered of primary importance to the perpetuation of this 
much valued political system.  Here, voting appears as a basic civic duty adhered to by villagers 
across caste and class. 
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Clearly, the concepts of right and duty evoke closely related meanings.  In search of first time 
voters, we approached a class of 50 female students at a local teacher training college, who 
were very explicit about the differences and the connections between the two terms: ‘The right 
to vote is an individual right (urimai), it’s a right given to us by the state.  But it is our duty 
(kadamai) to use it, it is our duty to select a good leader.’ While urimai is understood as a formal 
right conveyed by the state onto its citizens, the way in which that right is made use of is 
perceived as a matter of personal (moral) duty or kadamai.  Either way voting is seen to be, in 
their words ‘a must’, and the young women we talked to further expanded on their love for their 
country, the importance of selecting good leaders and their determination to  vote for the first 
time in the 2009 elections. 
 
Two broader insights can be drawn from the above ethnography.  First, a strong language of 
rights is used across the social spectrum.  This language reveals an understanding of voting as 
key to being recognised by the state as a citizen of India, to participating in the political affairs of 
the state, and to the realisation of democracy itself.  These are matters that are valued by all 
villagers, and not solely the poor. Second, the language of rights and the language of duty are 
closely interconnected and mobilised by the same informants.  So rather than the poor drawing 
on a language of rights and the non-poor mobilising a language of duty (Ahuja and Chhibber 
2012), we found ample evidence of people using both terms together, often in the same 
sentence, to reflect on their rights and duties as voters.  This reveals urimai and kadamai as two 
sides of the same coin9. 
 
Where, then, does such strong political awareness and civic sense of rights and duties come 
from?  While standard school text books no doubt inculcate a sense of citizenship and make 
youngsters aware of their voting rights, we need to look beyond this to understand the particular 
commitment to voting in rural Tamil Nadu today.  Answers can be found in the specific history of 
political mobilisation in Tamil Nadu that, as we set out in the introduction, has been 
characterised by a long legacy of populist mobilisation by the Dravidian parties that raised 
political awareness among the population, based on popular imagery and rhetoric of Tamil 
identity and Dravidian self-rule (Harriss 2000, Wyatt 2013b).  Later, as more and more social 
groups began to feel disenfranchised within the dominant parties, new caste-based parties, 
                                                 
9 See also Ruud for a discussion of how vernacular terms for right, duty and citizenship are drawn upon by 
Bangladeshi villagers, and how they express their understanding of voting ‘as a fundamental right, one that one is 
under obligation to exercise’ (2011: 54). 
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including Dalit parties, further raised awareness, especially among Dalits and low castes.  They 
emphasised the importance of civic rights and political participation to challenging higher-caste 
economic and political dominance (Gorringe 2007, 2010, Karthikeyan et al 2012).  In addition, 
Tamil Nadu’s charismatic leaders – from MGR in the 1960 to Vijaykanth today - continue to use 
their cinematic appeal to raise cognizance of rights and entitlements, and to present political 
organisation and electoral participation as solutions to social injustices and economic 
oppression (Pandian 1992).  Finally, programmatic policies and their associated universal 
welfare schemes – themselves cast in a strong rights-based language – have further enhanced 
people’s consciousness of rights and entitlements.  Together with rising levels of literacy and 
education among the state’s rural population, these political dynamics go a long way to account 
for this remarkable awareness of electoral rights and duties among Tamil Nadu’s rural 
population (Krishnan 2008). 
  
Loyalties, histories and caste identification: voting for respect   
 
But for many informants much more is at stake in casting a vote; voting is associated with 
receiving not just recognition but respect from the state.  Priya, a Christian woman who 
commutes daily for work in Tiruppur, was asked what she would do if she didn’t get leave to 
vote.  She exclaimed: ‘I will just go [to vote]! I have to vote! It is our right (urimai) to vote.’ What 
do you mean by right?  ‘The government gives us no other benefits, it only respects us in that 
regard, this is the only place where they respect us!’ Respect from the state is frequently 
mentioned by informants, and it is the fact of being on an equal footing in the eyes of the state 
that is particularly valued by the villagers of Allapuram. Let us explore this further with reference 
to narratives not only of why people vote but also who they vote for.  Often, people’s electoral 
participation is strongly driven by a wish to vote for a particular party or person. Here various 
loyalties – to family, party or charismatic leader – appear significant, and caste identities are 
central to the search for respect. 
 
To start with, many voters have strong family or caste traditions of supporting a particular party 
and would not dream of swapping allegiances, even though they may not always be pleased 
with the party’s particular policies or candidates.  Party loyalty is particularly strong among 
activists, but also runs through ordinary families, many of whom have voted for the same party 
for generations.  We find that answers about why people vote for a particular party shed light on 
why people vote at all. Mohan, a leading Gounder ADMK activist in the village, has been an 
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ADMK councillor for the last 5 years, following his mother in that role.  They have been ADMK 
supporters for a long time, and their support has become unconditional: ‘Whatever Amma 
[ADMK leader] says, we will do.  The way Amma goes, is our way!’ 
 
While sons and daughters may follow the voting of their parents, and wives that of their 
husbands, there are certainly limits to family loyalty too, and we came across many women who 
admitted voting differently from their husbands or youngsters voting differently from their 
parents.  Karpagam, a young first time voter had decided, in a change to family party loyalties, 
that she would vote DMDK, a new regional party started in 2005 by the hugely popular film actor 
Vijaykanth.  She was trying hard to convince her parents to vote for him too.  The charisma of 
Vijaykanth attracted the interest of many younger voters in the village and, while not gaining any 
seats, generated over 3 million votes in the state as a whole (or 10% of the votes) (Koteswara 
Prasad 2009: 122).  Poornima, a woman of the barber caste, confided to us that she voted 
Congress even though most of her relatives vote ADMK.  Smiling, she told us ‘I am not telling 
anyone, but I have always voted Congress, my father voted Congress and I have always liked 
the party.’ Secrecy, or not revealing who one votes for, is particularly adhered to by women who 
feel passionate about their personal right to vote and to make their own choice.   
 
Some people’s loyalties are based on a powerful historical identification with a party or a party 
leader, often a charismatic founding person.  This identification often extends beyond the 
individual or the household and can apply to entire communities.  This is the case of the low-
ranking Matharis, who have a longstanding caste-wide loyalty towards the ADMK.  One woman 
from the Mathari community said she had always voted for ADMK: ‘when I get to the booth and 
see irettalai [two-leaves, the ADMK party symbol], I will always vote for it!’  Another Mathari 
woman who initially said that she just votes for whoever helps her, then went on to explain that 
she felt that there was no real decision to take: ‘we always vote for one party, so there is no 
decision to take. It comes generation after generation; all our forefathers voted for that party. 
The person who gave us this land, built this house, gave us free electricity – they are all of this 
party.’ 
 
Several Matharis explained how they closely associate irettalai [two-leaves symbol] with ‘MGR’ 
[M G Ramachandran]. MGR continues to be spoken of with great reverence and fondness, and 
pictures of him appear on all ADMK campaigning posters and leaflets. It is not unusual for 
voters to talk about him in the present tense – although he died over 20 years ago – and to 
19 
mention their love for MGR as the main reason why they vote ADMK today.  A Mathari mother 
and agricultural labourer explained her love for MGR with much emotion: 
Here, our children could not sit in the same chair as them [Gounder children] and they 
could not sit inside [the school building].  Now all that is possible thanks to him.  We 
used to have to stand up when they [Gounders] passed our house and show them 
respect. … Because of him we haven’t got that fear (atcham) anymore.  He said all our 
children should go to school, and he started free school meals and introduced eggs for 
the children … What MGR did, Amma is now following too … Whether I die tomorrow or 
live another 50 years, I won’t change the party I vote for!   
 
These feelings not only explain why she votes ADMK but also why she is so strongly 
commitment to the act of voting itself. MGR – the most influential actor and politician in Tamil 
Nadu’s recent history – remains remarkably alive in the minds of Allapuram’s Matharis today.  
More than the party’s current policies, what is at stake at the time of elections is the perceived 
respect given by the ADMK to the Matharis.   The party and its leaders – MGR in the past and 
Jayalalitha today – are seen as key to the enhancement of Matharis’ sense of dignity and self-
respect, to the promotion of equality and ‘upliftment’, and to the transformation of social 
relations in the village and beyond.  It is their identity – as low caste and poor people – and its 
transformation over time that the Matharis talk about when reflecting on ‘their party’, ‘their 
leader’, and their overwhelming desire to vote.  Here, voting transpires as a means through 
which one’s very identity as a community is reproduced.  Voting itself acts as a means by which 
villagers come to express and reproduce group identities, and assert their self-respect as Dalits. 
 
A similar pattern is to be found among the other Dalit caste in the village, the Adi Dravidas, who 
closely identify with the DMK and its long-term leader Karunanidhi.  They consider the DMK a 
party that takes care of them in several ways.  Many of them have government jobs, or as 
Ayyadurai, a strong DMK supporter, put it ‘in each family there is a government employee and 
the DMK is known for giving good support to government staff, so that’s why many vote DMK in 
our area’.  Moreover, as Christians and a minority group, they feel that voting ADMK would be 
too risky given the party’s earlier alliance with the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP).  Security is without a doubt an issue for them.  Priya explains ‘I am a Christian and I will 
look after my safety. I will choose a party under whose rule there have been no communal 
clashes.’  Her parents joined in the conversation and further elaborated:  
When Advani [BJP] was in rule we had communal problems and when Jayalalitha was 
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chief minister in Tamil Nadu there were problems. … So we don’t want them to come to 
power.  Because of that most Christians vote DMK.  
 
Minority identity, security and particular government schemes are all related factors that 
Christian Adi Dravidas consider when voting, and that have consolidated their allegiance to the 
DMK.  Among the village Adi Dravidas voting constitutes a key tool in the protection and 
reproduction of their identity as both Christians and upwardly mobile Dalits, who benefited from 
education and government employment over the last decades.  Patently, caste identity plays a 
key role here and propels the poor and low caste to vote, and to vote for a particular party.  
However, while not discussed in detail here, higher castes, such as the Gounders, in the village 
also tend to support particular parties (such as the newly launched Gounder-led KNMK), so that 
caste-based political loyalties can certainly not be identified as merely a low-caste phenomenon 
(De Neve and Carswell 2011, Wyatt 2010).  What can be concluded from the above is that for 
the village Dalits, voting is also about respect and dignity (see also Ruud 2011: 68).   
 
As this material illustrates, charismatic leaders continue to play a key role in mobilising voters in 
Allapuram.  Matharis dwell on the legacy of MGR, Adi Dravidas consider Karunanidhi’s alliances 
and his schemes for government employees, and youngsters from across castes are being 
wooed to the polling booth by the charm and promises of the latest actor-turned-politician, 
Vijaykanth (Koteswara Prasad 2012, Rogers 2009).  In the meanwhile, being dissatisfied with 
the popular policies of both DMK and ADMK, increasing numbers of disgruntled Gounders turn 
to their own leaders of the newly-established KNMK in the hope that shifting their votes might 
make a difference.  
 
4. Who does not vote, and why? 
 
Having looked at why people tell us they vote, we now turn the question why people do not vote. 
Voter turnout in the 2009 national elections reached an all-time high of 73% in Tamil Nadu, 
while voter turnout was even higher in Allapuram: 78% of those on the voters’ list cast their vote.  
So, why did the other 22% not vote on election day and how can non-voting be explained? We 
obtained a copy of the voters’ list after the election, which had marked on it who had voted and 
who had not.  We then managed to follow up 76 of the 105 people marked as non-voters to find 
out the reasons behind their non-vote. About a third of these people should not have been on 
the voters’ list at all, either because they now lived elsewhere (21%) or had died (11%). A 
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significant group (18%) appeared on the list and told us they had wanted to vote, but did not 
have a valid voter’s ID. Another group (18%) were either too ill or elderly to get to the polling 
booth, while a further 9% said they were looking after ill people or at the hospital. 7% said they 
couldn’t vote for work related reasons, while 9% of those marked as not voting, told us that they 
had in fact voted.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting group was the 18% who did not have a voter’s card and so were 
unable to vote. Many of those, being on the voters’ list and having voted many times in the past, 
assumed that they would be able to vote with, for example, a ration card or another form of ID.   
Before polling day there was a widespread belief that the ration card would be acceptable for 
those without a voter’s card. But on voting day, people on the voter’s list but who did not have a 
voter ID card, were not allowed to vote with the result that a sizeable number of individuals 
could not cast their vote. 
 
A second major reason why people didn’t vote is that they are on a voters’ list, but not where 
they are currently resident: this particularly affects women (who often move on marriage) and 
labour migrants. The Tiruppur region of Tamil Nadu has high rates of labour migration, both to 
and from the area.  Many migrants, however, do not transfer their vote because they are unsure 
how long they will live away from the area, while others mean to transfer their vote but never get 
around to it. Many migrants reported that transferring one’s voter’s card is not straightforward 
and that problems routinely occur when they try to transfer their voter’s card to a new place of 
residence.  Indeed, 21% of the non-voters in Allapuram who we managed to trace were people 
who had moved elsewhere but were still on the voter’s list in Allapuram. Similarly, in-migrants 
into the village may not yet have registered in Allapuram appearing on the voters’ list in their 
previous place of residence. For many the cost, in terms of bus fares and time off work, makes 
returning to vote prohibitively expensive so they end up not voting at all.  All this reveals that 
bureaucratic hurdles to registering in a new place of residence form real obstacles for many 
migrants and married women, and that as a result many who are keen to vote end up being 
unable to do so.   
 
Another group of non-voters are those who are too ill or elderly, who are caring for others, or 
have work commitments that prevent them from taking time off.  They add up to about one third 
of the non-voters.  While many of them were genuinely unable to make it to the booth, we also 
need to recognise that others offer such explanations as mere excuses where in fact they 
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simply have little interest in voting.  Yet, under the weight of social pressure to vote and the 
hegemonic discourse that presents elections as key to democracy, many feel they cannot just 
say that they have no interest in this form of political participation, and thus offer excuses that 
are easily accepted by kin and neighbours, let alone inquiring fieldworkers.  
 
A small minority of villagers, however, are rather apathetic and disinterested particularly among 
the young and the very old.  One young Adi Dravida man, Ravi, showed no interest in voting at 
all: he told us that as he had been given a day off for the election, he and a group of friends had 
decided to visit a nearby theme park for the day.  Other first-time voters hadn’t even registered: 
a group of young Mathari women said they hadn’t registered to vote as they were unclear how 
to, and thought that someone else would do it for them. Some older voters too showed little 
interest in politics, often because they have become so disheartened with past governments 
that they see no point in voting, convinced that it is not going to make any difference anyway.   
 
A last significant group of non-voters are those who did not even appear on the voters’ list yet 
were keen to vote.  Many of them are young, first-time-voters who hadn’t managed to get 
registered on time.  Some had tried to get registered, such as Karpagam, who had applied for a 
voter’s card well ahead of the election and assumed she was on the list. But the card never 
arrived and on polling day she discovered she was not on the voters’ list.  In fact, many first-time 
voters found themselves in a similar position and were unable to vote.  Rather than revealing 
apathy, this group’s eagerness to vote suggests that official voter turnout results may even 
underestimate the actual commitment to voting among the young.  Clearly, bureaucratic delays 
in the registration process prevented some villagers from participating in this much-anticipated 
democratic event. 
 
Our post-election follow-up thus revealed a number of issues.  First, non-voting was caused by 
a variety of reasons, with bureaucratic obstacles to registering and obtaining a voter’s card as 
well as migration being major factors preventing many from voting. Second, political apathy and 
disinterest explain the behaviour of only a very small portion of an already small percentage of 
non-voters.  As reported by other observers (Palshikar 2011), these non-voters constitute only a 
very small section of the population and cannot easily be identified with a particular social 
group.  Instead, many villagers’ distress over the inability to vote only reaffirms the huge 
commitment to voting found among the people of Allapuram. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In India voting remains probably the most important form of political participation today (Harriss 
2005).  Voter turnout rates in Tamil Nadu have been remarkably high since the 1950s, and have 
been rising steadily over the last 10 years.  Our ethnographic study of Allapuram, a village in 
western Tamil Nadu, sheds light on this issue and suggests some explanations with a wider 
relevance. 
 
People’s passionate insistence that voting is the most fundamental right they have and their 
assertion that it is their personal duty to make use of it indicates an high awareness of voting as 
a medium of democratic assertion – best captured in the oft-repeated statement ‘it is the only 
right we’ve got!’  Here, voting appears as the very essence of democracy and of what it means 
to be a citizen of India.  In addition, our ethnography reveals that an emotional attachment to 
voting also emerges from a search for recognition and respect from the state.  While this applies 
to all communities, poor and non-poor alike, for Dalits in particular this is a significant driver to 
vote.  It is only on election day that they feel the state treats them as equal to other citizens, and 
it is on this day that their identity as citizens is realized (Ahuja and Chibber 2012, Banerjee 
2007, Ruud 2011). Furthermore, Dalits’ wish for recognition and respect as low caste 
communities is also connected to long-term caste loyalties to particular parties and party 
figureheads that are seen as patrons of the marginalized and that continue to shape the political 
imagination of many communities today.  Hence, we argue, elections form unique moments that 
allow ordinary people to experience an individual sense of rights and duties as citizens and as 
producers of democracy itself, while at the same time allowing them to pursue recognition, 
respect and assertion as members of particular communities.  It is precisely this dual feature 
that makes voting and electoral participation so enduringly attractive to Tamil Nadu’s 
contemporary electorate. 
 
Much of this, we argue, is the outcome of a long legacy of populist mobilisation by the Dravidian 
parties that raised political consciousness among the population, drawing on popular imagery 
and rhetoric of Tamil identity, self-respect and nationalism (Harriss 2000, Wyatt 2013b).  The 
cinema too played a central role in the circulation of this political awareness, and charismatic 
leaders, many of whom hailed from the popular world of film, fuelled the political interest of the 
Tamil people (Dickey 1993, Rogers 2009).  Over the last couple of decades, this awareness 
was further kindled by new caste-based parties, including Dalit parties, which emphasised the 
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importance of civic rights and political participation to challenging higher-caste economic and 
political dominance. Indeed, Dalit parties’ ‘role in spreading a legal awareness and rights 
consciousness amongst the oppressed cannot be overstated’ (Karthikeyan et al 2012: 33), and 
they too have encouraged villagers’ electoral participation.   
 
Moreover, villagers remain hopeful that elections will produce better governance with social and 
economic justice for all.  This hope is not entirely unfounded.  Indeed, over the last three 
elections it has been invigorated by a renewed interest among the two main Dravidian parties in 
programmatic party politics, which focuses increasingly on the delivery of universal welfare 
schemes and good governance (Wyatt 2013a and 2013b).  Such a programmatic approach 
does not mean that clientelist politics have completely disappeared, but rather that good 
governance and welfare provision have become routine expectations among the electorate that 
parties can no longer ignore.  Moreover, villagers’ extensive discussions of a range of 
government policies indicate that state welfare provision, good governance and sound 
economic management are important matters on which parties are critically assessed (Wyatt 
2013b: 9-12).  While sound programme delivery might not in itself guarantee electoral success 
(as indicated by the DMK defeat in the 2011 state elections), the programmatic turn in Tamil 
politics has certainly consolidated electoral interest among the rural population, as reflected in 
rising voter turnout rates post-2004.  
 
We have suggested that no single factor can account for why people vote in our village and by 
extension in Tamil Nadu as a whole.  In this southern state a combination of the above factors 
underpin high levels of political awareness and electoral participation, including among the less 
educated members of rural constituencies.  While not all of these factors may be prevalent 
across India, several of them have certainly been identified in other states too and we contend 
that each of them should be considered in explanations of particular electoral participation rates. 
There are, for example, clear indications that a renewed focus on development, good 
governance and welfare provision have become crucial in appealing to voters across India.  
Ashutosh Kumar, for instance, attributes some of Bihar’s chief minister Nitish Kumar’s recent 
popularity to his focus on economic development and on channelling ‘resources to provide 
quality governance in an erstwhile “failed state”’ (2013: 101).  Yadav similarly notes that at least 
part of the 2009 electoral success at the national level can be ascribed to the fact that ‘the 
Congress leadership skilfully used the opportunities offered by economic growth and revenue 
buoyancy by deploying the symbolism of the aam aadmi [common man] and by designing some 
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potentially far reaching welfare policies’ (2009: 42).  In rural Bangladesh, Ruud found that 
people vote in order to elect ‘efficient’ and ‘experienced’ leaders who are likely to deliver 
‘development’ (2011: 58-64). Whatever reason they vote for, our study from Tamil Nadu has 
shown that high levels of electoral participation indicate substantive amounts of political 
awareness and rights consciousness, and it is this underlying awareness that turns voting into a 
meaningful act of democracy. 
 
References 
Ahuja, A. and P. Chibber (2012) ‘Why the poor vote in India: “If I don’t vote, I am dead to the 
State’, Studies in Comparative International Development DOI 10.1007/s12116-012-
9115-6 
Banerjee, M. (2007) ‘Sacred Elections’, Economic and Political Weekly 42(17): 1556-1562. 
Blais, A., E. Gidengil and N. Nivette (2004) ‘Where does voter turnout decline come from?’, 
European Journal of Political Research 43(2): 221-36. 
Carswell, G., (2013) ‘Dalits and local labour markets in rural India: experiences from  the 
Tiruppur textile region in Tamil Nadu’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 38(2): 325-338. 
Carswell, G. and G. De Neve (2013) ‘From field to factory: Tracing bonded labour in the 
Coimbatore powerloom industry’, Tamil Nadu’, Economy and Society 42(3): 430-353. 
Carswell, G. and G. De Neve (2014a) ‘T-shirts and Tumblers: caste, dependency and work 
under neoliberalisation in south India’, Contributions to Indian Sociology 48(1): 103-131 
Carswell, G. and G. De Neve (2014b) ‘MGNREGA in Tamil Nadu: a story of success and 
transformation’, Journal of Agrarian Change.  
Chandra, K. (2004) ‘Elections as auctions’, Seminar 539.  
Chandra, K. (2009) ‘Why voters in patronage democracies split their tickets: strategic voting for 
ethnic parties’, Electoral Studies 28: 21-32. 
De Neve, G. and G. Carswell (2011) ‘NREGA and the Return of Identity Politics in Western 
Tamil Nadu, India’, Forum for Development Studies 38(2): 2005-2010. 
De Neve, G and G. Carswell (in prep) ‘Litigation Against Political Organisation? The politics of 
Dalit mobilisation against Gounder dominance in Western Tamil Nadu’, (Submitted to 
Development and Change July 2013) 
Dickey, S. (1993) Cinema and the Urban Poor in South India. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Diwakar, R. (2008) ‘Voter Turnout in the Indian States: An Empirical Analysis’, Journal of 
elections, public opinions and parties 18(1): 75-100. 
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. 
Franklin, M. (2004) Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established 
Democracies Since 1945. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Gorringe, H. (2007) Taming the Dalit Panthers: Dalit Politics in Tamil Nadu’, Journal of South 
Asian Development 2(1): 51-73. 
Gorringe, H. (2010). ‘The new Caste Headmen? Dalit Movement Leadership in Tamil Nadu’, in 
P. Price and A.E. Ruud (eds) Power and Influence in India: Bosses, Lords and Captains. 
London: Routledge.  
Gray, M. and M. Caul (2000) ‘Declining voter turnout in advanced industrial democracies, 1950-
1997: The effects of declining group mobilization’, Comparative Political Studies 33(9): 
1099-1122. 
Hansen, T. B. (1999) The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India. 
26 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Harriss, J. (2000) ‘Populism, Tamil Style: Is It Really a Success?’, Review of Development and 
Change 5(2): 332–46. 
Harriss, J. (2002) ‘Whatever Happened to Cultural Nationalism in Tamil Nadu? A Reading of 
Current Events and the Recent Literature on Tamil Politics’, Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics 40(3): 97-117 
Harriss, J. (2005) ‘Political participation, representation and the urban poor: findings from 
research in Delhi’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(11): 1041-1054. 
Heyer, J. (2012) ‘Labour Standards and Social Policy: A South Indian Case Study’, Global 
Labour Journal 3(1): 91-117. 
Jaffrelot, C. (2008) ‘”Why Should We Vote?”: The Indian Middle Class and the Functioning of 
the World’s Largest Democracy’, in Jaffrelot, C and van der Veer, P (eds) Patterns of 
Middle Class Consumption in India and China. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Jeffrey, C. (2000) ‘Democratisation without representation? The power and political strategies of 
a rural elite in north India’, Political Geography 19(8): 1013-1036. 
Karthikeyan, D., S. Rajangam, H. Gorringe (2012) ‘Dalit political imagination and replication in 
Contemporary Tamil Nadu’, Economic and Political Weekly XLVII(36): 30-34. 
Kitschelt , H. and S. I. Wilkinson (eds) (2007) Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic 
Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge: CUP.  
Koteswara Prasad, G. (2009) ‘Tamil Nadu: Against Expectations’, Economic and Political 
Weekly, XLIV (39): 121-124, 
Krishna, A. (2008) ‘Do poor people care less for democracy? Testing individual-level 
assumptions with individual level data from India’, in Krishna, A et al (eds) Poverty, 
Participation and Democracy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp65-93. 
Kumar, A. (2013). ‘Development Focus and Electoral Success at State Level: Nitish Kumar as 
Bihar’s Leader’, South Asia Research 33(2): 101-121. 
Kumar, S. (2009) ‘Patterns of political participation: trends and perspectives’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, XVIV (39): 47-51. 
Lama-Rewal, S. (2009) ‘Studying elections in India: Scientific and political debates’, South Asia 
Multidisciplinary Academic Journal Vol 3.  
Markussen, T. (2011) ‘Inequality and political clientelism: Evidence from South India’, Journal of 
Development Studies 47(11): 1721-1738. 
Palshikar, S. (2011)  ‘Every Vote Counts’, The Indian Express [Available online at: 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/every-vote-counts/776392/; Last accessed 
12/01/2013] 
Palshikar, S. and S. Kumar (2004) ‘Participatory norm: How broad-based is it?’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, 39(51): 5412-5417. 
Pandian, M.S.S. (1992) The Image trap : MG Ramachandran in film and politics. Sage 
Publications, Delhi.  
Rogers, M. (2009) ‘Between Fantasy and ‘Reality’: Tamil Film Star Fan Club Networks and the 
Political Economy of Film Fandom’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 32(1): 
63-85. 
Ruud, A. E. (2011) ‘Democracy in Bangladesh: A Village View’, in Madsen, S T et al (eds) 
Trysts with Democracy: Political Practice in South Asia London: Anthem Press. pp45-70. 
Special Statistics: 2011 State Elections (2011) ‘Fourteenth Assembly Election Results in Tamil 
Nadu’, Economic and Political Weekly XLVI (25): 138-142. 
Still, C. (2011) ‘Spoiled brides and the fear of education: Honour and social mobility among 
Dalits in south India’, Contemporary South Asia 45(5): 1119-1146. 
Subramanian, N. (1999) Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and 
Democracy in South India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
Witsoe, J. (2011) ‘Rethinking Postcolonial Democracy: An Examination of the Politics of Lower-
27 
Caste Empowerment in North India’, American Anthropologist 113(4): 619-631. 
Wyatt, A. (2010) Party System Change in south India: Political entrepreneurs, patterns and 
processes. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Wyatt, A. (2013a)  ‘Combining clientelist and programmatic politics in Tamil Nadu, South India’, 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 51(1): 27-55. 
Wyatt, A. (2013b) ‘Populism and politics in contemporary Tamil Nadu’, Contemporary South 
Asia 21(4):  365-381. 
Yadav, Y. (2009) ‘Between Fortuna and Virtu: Explaining the Congress' Ambiguous Victory in 
2009’, Economic and Political Weekly, 44(39):33-46. 
Yadav, Y. (1996) ‘Reconfiguration in Indian Politics: State Assembly Elections, 1993-95’, 
Economic and Political Weekly, 31(2/3) 95-104 
Yadav, Y. (2000) ‘Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends of Bahujan 
Participation in Electoral Politics in the 1990s’, in F. Frankel et al (eds) Transforming 
India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy. New Delhi: OUP. 
 
